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CONGRATULATIONS FROM YOUR
CONTINENTAL COUSINS, 10b-5: SECURITIES




C ONGRATULATIONS, Rule lOb-5, from your European cousins.
Upon this historic occasion, I wish to offer my formal congratula-
tions to Rule lOb-5, then look at lOb-5 from the European branch of the
securities law family, and briefly tell you where "we" stand in Europe
with respect to securities fraud law. I will then discuss the German rela-
tives of Rule 10b-5-the distant relatives as well as some closer cousins-
and draw some analogies. Additionally, I will consider other Western
European analogues and conclude with a question for you, lOb-5.
Cousin, you come from a very well established family with a large,
rich, and continuous history and tradition. In the fifty years of your
existence, you have branched out into an impressive family tree of securi-
ties fraud regulation. But, lOb-5, you never lost your importance as an
all-encompassing general clause supplemented by your own decisional
case law in the United States. You are still competing with, or at least
complementing, the other family members, including a host of other spe-
cial sections of the securities acts, rules, and regulations which were not
able to obviate you from existence. From a Continental perspective, your
distinct character lies in your all-encompassing, sweeping language
which we Europeans are accustomed to finding in our civil law system.
Upon this type of sweeping language, we would build a whole range of
decisional law. From our view, the anomaly is that this sweeping lan-
guage is found in the very specific Rule lOb-5, in a highly regulated envi-
ronment, and in a common law country. Normally, in a common law
system, the statutes are very precise, very plain-meaning oriented, and
would not contain such sweeping language. Rather, they would be pre-
cise in their circumscription of the original individual circumstances of
what was regulated. This is something which we find a bit surprising.
Rule 10b-5 arose from a simple argument: "We are against fraud,
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aren't we?" In Europe, we are also against fraud and securities fraud,
but we regulate fraud in a totally different manner.
We are, as measured against the bulk of what has evolved from Rule
lOb-5 over the last fifty years, very poor cousins indeed, if any cousins at
all. We are poor in history because we lack lOb-5's fifty years of uninter-
rupted history. We are poor in case law because we do not have estab-
lished decisional law. We are poor in refined theory because the theory
of capital markets and the securities laws that have developed over the
years in the United States do not yet exist in Europe. On a practical
level, we are also poor because our banking system and capital markets
differ greatly from those of the United States and do not easily allow for
enactment of 10b-5 analogues. Moreover, we are also poor in the volume
of books written on the subject.
But still, I want to address you as a German, a related cousin; to a
certain degree, I also speak for the other Continental cousins. Some dis-
tant derivations of Rule 10b-5 are found in Europe. These, however, in
theory, are not direct off-springs of Rule lOb-5. They are cousins, I
would say, of second degree or third degree. Elements of Rule lOb-5
crossed the Atlantic over to Europe not so much by direct need or inheri-
tance but by de facto development arising from the fact that the United
States is our most important trade partner. The United States has a re-
fined securities regulatory system and a highly refined regulatory body,
the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC"). We do not have
such a regulatory body in Europe. The United States also provides mas-
sive amounts of capital and has major banks and investment in-
termediaries in Europe. Trained in the lOb-5 environment, investment
bankers in Europe act accordingly.
Last night I had a discussion with an investment banker, who practices
in New York and Europe. He was commenting that there was no legal
culture of 10b-5 in Europe, rightly so. I explained to him the theme of
this lecture, the relationship between Rule 10b-5 and European securities
fraud laws, and the fact that the United States plays a major role in inter-
national organizations dealing with securities regulation (e.g., IOSCO).
The United States has contacts with the EC Commission, with the inter-
national banking community, and on the professional level. So, we do
have many de facto links.
Consequently, on the Continent, we are aware of many of the short-
comings of our system-in particular, our universal banking system-
and we are becoming more oriented towards a capital market economy.
We will continue to follow your evolvement and look forward to a review
of European developments within the next fifty years. Happy Birthday
Rule 10b-5.
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I. RULE lOb-5 FROM THE CONTINENTAL FA .mLY PERSPECTIVE
A. As We Perceive You: The U.S. Regulations and Rules
The general nature of Rule lOb-5 makes it a unique clause for Ameri-
can law. In the Continental civil law system, we have systematically
built whole theories and whole libraries of law books on one sentence.
This is not customary, however, in the American common law system.
Because of lOb-5's sweeping language and scope, it would be easy to en-
vision a similar clause somewhere in German securities law, but it does
not exist.
It is fortunate that Rule lOb-5 is preceded by a definitional section.
For instance, in your Securities Act, you have a definition of "securities,"
"exchanges," and "purchase" and "sale" of securities. We do not have
this.
An aspect of your securities laws that Germans find confusing is that
there are a whole host of other particular statutes, rules, and regulations
dealing with the same subject matter that is already covered by lOb-5.
For instance, section 9 of the '34 Act on the manipulation of securities
prices, section 16 on the liabilities of officers, directors, and principal
shareholders, section 18 on misleading statements, section 12, section 17,
and, in particular, section 15 on broker/dealers all deal with aspects of
10b-5. This redundancy is difficult for us to understand. As I under-
stand, Rule lOb-5 also allows for an implied private right of action which
furthers the enforcement of SEC rules and regulations. It also deals with
deceit and includes common law actions of deception, so it involves a
great number of issues.
One of these particular issues is insider trading, a problem with which
we are grappling in Germany. We have taken note of many other issues
in the development of lOb-5, such as market insiders-primary insiders
as well as secondary insiders-the scope of investment protection, the
scope of market protection, and the fraud on the market theory. Like the
efficient market hypothesis, all of these things developed within lOb-5's
sphere of influence. Remedies also developed: the rescission of con-
tracts, damages, waiver, estoppel, loss of bargain, benefit of the bargain,
and disgorgment of profits. I understand that punitive damages are un-
available, but I have seen incidences of treble damages. Moreover, you
can use class actions; we cannot because class actions do not exist in our
system. We also have a problem with the statute of limitations, although
there is not a uniform set of limitations in the United States either. We
partly have the same problems. From my view, this is how we perceive
lOb-5.
B. Where We Stand: The Continental Difference
Now, where does the Continental branch of the lob-5 family tree
stand? You must remember that in Europe, if you look at the European
Community (the "EC"), we do not have a commission like the SEC, a
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joint regulator, or a legislative body dealing with the securities regula-
tions. We do not even have fifty years of joint or common experience in
capital markets and securities purchases. In the EC, we do not have a
single legal system, but rather we have twelve separate legal systems and
twelve distinct financial and capital markets.' There is a degree of frag-
mentation in the EC; the EC acts only by way of directive in the securi-
ties field. Accordingly, if a directive is issued, we always require national
implementation. The EC directives serve as somewhat of a framework, a
rather artificial construction, which only come to life through a member
state's implementation. The United States' securities laws provide a ju-
risdictional link between the various states when a crime is perpetrated
involving the mails, interstate commerce, or a risk to national security.
The EC does not have such a link between its member states. We do not
have a single EC stock exchange; we must regulate the common market
in Western Europe on the national levels rather than on an international
EC level. Furthermore, it is doubtful that an EC regulator will come to
be in the near future.
II. 10b-5 AND ITS GERMAN RELATIVES
Let us turn now to the German side of the family and look at Rule
10b-5's German relatives. In order to approach the German relatives,
however, I think it is important to first understand our system. The facts
and figures that I will give you are based on the German system, but the
description holds true, to a certain degree for Belgium, the Netherlands,
Spain, Italy, and France and the other EC member states, and, to a more
limited degree, for the United Kingdom.
A. Our Difference: Structure of the Capital Market
In Germany, which is a federal state, we do not have a central author-
ity like the SEC. We have no federal law dealing with securities fraud
and capital markets regulation. To the contrary, we still have a mainly
state-run self-regulatory system. The theory is that the stock exchanges
and corporate bodies will take care of themselves and no state interven-
tion beyond that is necessary except for extreme circumstances of actual
deceit or fraud.
One of the main differences between the U.S. and Germany is that the
majority of German companies are mainly organized as private, limited
liability companies ("GmbHs"), the shares of which are non-transferable
securities, not embodied in certificates, not quoted on any exchange, and
not providing a liquid market. Public or stock corporations differ from
GmbHs in that the stock certificates of such corporations are transferable
1. I would like to allude here to a presentation I made last year which was reprinted
in the Fordham Law Review, where I tried to outline some of the fragmentation within
the EC. See Gerhard Wegen, Transnational Financial Services-Current Challenges for
an Integrated Europe, 60 Fordham L. Rev. 591 (1992).
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securities. In Germany, we have approximately 2500 stock corporations,
and approximately 500,000 GmbHs. Naturally, most of German indus-
trial activity is conducted by the 500,000 GmbHs, whose shares require
notarial recording to be transferred; in contrast, stock corporation may
be listed on a stock exchange. We also have some 30,000 general part-
nerships and approximately 130,000 limited partnerships-a type of cor-
porate structure with which you are familiar in the United States.
If you look at the German stock exchanges you will note that in the
end of 1991 only 799 classes of shares of German corporations were actu-
ally traded and quoted on these exchanges. Together with the 639
classes of shares of non-German companies, there are a total of 1438
classes of shares.2 Out of the approximately 2500 stock corporation, only
665 are actually listed on one of the German stock exchanges. That is a
number to keep in mind. If you look at the current American markets,
you will see very different numbers for the New York Stock Exchange,
the American Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, and all of the other regional
and national markets that you have developed over the years.
The future development of the German markets is quite clear for sev-
eral reasons. The bulk of enterprises are medium size companies that are
not organized as stock corporations. In our system, there is a conspicu-
ous lack of institutional investors and, in particular, a dearth of pension
funds. We do not have such funds because our pension and retirement
systems work differently from those in the United States. Hostile and
public takeovers are unheard of, not only in Germany but also on most of
the Continent; the United Kingdom is an exception to this rule.
The German banks have a tight grip on the financing of these compa-
nies. The banks take seats on companies' supervisory boards, if a com-
pany has one. They also trade shares both on and off the stock exchanges
for their own account. They can deal in their own shares, even if they
are stock corporations. They solicit proxies for voting in the companies'
general assemblies.
The universal banks in our system have also developed close ties with
the preeminent companies through interlocking directorates and equity
participations. In Germany industry, we have a significant amount of
what we call "ringwise accumulated equity participation." It is our
traditional belief that a self-regulatory system with the self-disciplining
force of one big, inside capital market group is the best way to handle
capital markets, as opposed to the Glass-Steagall type of fractioning of
the banking functions and the different types of intermediate functions.
As I stated earlier, we do not have a central regulatory agency like the
SEC. We do, however, have the German Bundesbank. The Bundesbank
promulgates guidelines on the issuance of deutsche mark denominated
bonds and other securities. We also have the German Banking Agency
in Berlin which is the supervisory authority for all banking activity in-
2. The figures for 1992 are not yet available, but they are not very different.
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cluding the regulation of domestic and foreign investment companies.
Investment companies fall within the Agency's authority because, under
German law, trading-the sale and purchase on a commercial level of
stocks and certificates-is as much a banking activity as any other securi-
ties-related activity.
We have eight stock exchanges on the single state level as well as our
Futures Exchange. The German Stock Exchange in Frankfurt, formerly
known as the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, is one of the eight stock ex-
changes. The regional exchanges in seven other cities have taken equity
participations in this exchange, and it now also administers the Futures
Exchange and the German clearing system. This, still today, is a self-
regulatory system. It is now a stock corporation, but its operation is
under the supervision of the state of Hessen and not under any kind of
federal supervisory institution.
In short, comprehensive market supervision, like that in the United
States, does not exist in Germany. There is no separation of the different
banking functions to which you are accustomed. Although I do not want
to dwell on this, this lack of market supervision will change with draft
legislation to be introduced based on the so-called "Waigel Paper." The
Waigel Paper was reproduced for the first time in the United States in the
Fordham Law Review as an Annex to my address last year.3 Based on
that paper, we will introduce market supervision by implementing some
of the EC directives. A separate Federal Securities Agency, the
Bundesaufsichtamt fdir das Wertpapier Wesen, will be domiciled in
Frankfurt. There is also draft legislation, which is not yet public, that
provides for supervision of the stock exchanges, off-the-exchange transac-
tions, and securities dealings. In particular, this draft legislation includes
notification requirements in connection with takeovers and adminis-
trating prospectus requirements in public securities sales situations.
Now, having said all of this, I want to discuss a matter, which I will
deal with in more detail in a moment, that we call "grey capital mar-
kets." As we do not have a liquid market for securities other than stocks
in stock corporations or bonds and debentures, there was a need for a
vehicle by which investors could invest capital in organizations such as
limited partnerships. There were many German partnerships which
were tax-driven, investment vehicles. We developed the grey capital
markets to satisfy their capital needs. There was no supervision of the
grey capital markets and, as a result, there was a great amount of fraud
in these markets. So, the courts were called upon to develop case law
dealing with these grey markets. This case law is the closest German
analogue to Rule lOb-5.
3. See Gerhard Wegen, Transnational Financial Services- Current Challenges for
an Integrated Europe, 60 Fordham L. Rev. S91, S107-S 116 (1992).
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B. Individual Relatives: Securities Fraud Regulation in Germany
Having now laid out the fundamentals, I want to describe briefly some
of Rule lOb-5's relatives in our system. I will begin with something that
may not be very obvious to you.
1. Unfair Competition Rules
One way of protecting market integrity is achieved by using unfair
competition laws. Our standard unfair competition act has been used in
the past to prohibit false or incomplete advertising for investment securi-
ties, limited partnerships shares, and the like. In particular, paragraph 3
of our unfair competition act penalizes misleading advertising. What is
misleading or against public policy may then be developed by recourse to
special rules, e.g., the existing special rules on prospectus liability, or cer-
tain non-binding guidelines issued by private institutions in connection
with prospectus auditing.
The remedies under the unfair competition act are mainly cease and
desist orders or judgments. They may, however, also provide for crimi-
nal liability in certain circumstances. If the individual investor sues, he
may require or ask for a rescission of a contract that was concluded
based on misleading advertising. Based on the general rules of the Civil
Code, damages may be requested but are outside the scope of our unfair
competition rules.
2. Investment Advice and Brokerage
The second area where we see a Rule lOb-5 relation is in investment
advisory relationships and broker-dealer relationships. This is not a cate-
gory per se because we do not have, with respect to securities, active
dealers, investment advisors, or broker-dealers. A test for determining
liability has been developed based on general rules in Germany and is
analyzed on a case by case basis. Under the test, the claimant must prove
that he or she built up a special confidence based on the defendant's con-
duct and that the claimant then relied on that advisor or broker or relied
simply on the special expertise of a set person. The cause of action im-
plied here is a particular claim for non-performance or partial, incom-
plete, or insufficient performance if there was actually a contract.
A second theory of liability, which in civil law is very important, is
based on pre-contractual liability. We call it culpa in contrahendo or
c..c. I do not know if you have this term here in the States, but it means
that even if a contract is not actually concluded, one side may be liable to
the other based on pre-contractual confidence and trust built up by ac-
tion based on certain reliances or special expertise (similar to estoppel
principles). For instance, the sales organization for securities or stocks is
made up of so-called investment advisors. They hold themselves out to
be advisors, but, in fact, they are a mere distribution organization. Such
1993]
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distributors may be liable even if the contract has not actually been
concluded.
3. Tort Liability
The third theory is tort liability which you also have in your system.
Tort rules apply directly, for example, paragraph 823 of our Civil Code,
or indirectly by way of reference to a rule not contained in our Civil
Code which, however, is designated to protect an investor, such as crimi-
nal sanctions in our Criminal Code. Remedies available to an injured
party in this area would be either rescission of the contract or what we
call "negative interest." Negative interest means that the injured party
is compensated to put him or her in the position he or she would have
occupied had the contract not been concluded. It is not specific perform-
ance, which we call "positive interest." In all these cases, the claim may
be based on mere negligence. Therefore, one does not have to prove in-
tent or gross negligence.
4. General Prospectus Liability
Another German relative to Rule lOb-5 is prospectus liability. We
have developed two different kinds of prospectus liability. General pro-
spectus liability does not require a formal prospectus. As a prospectus,
any form of market-related written information is sufficient-any piece
of paper that might protect the investor. Of course, we then have the
prohibition against furnishing false or incomplete material facts in con-
nection with the investment decision. Not every false statement or inac-
curate information would be sufficient; it would have to meet the
materiality test. The prospectus information must be current, I think
that is the same in your system; it might even require the disclosure of
certain equity holdings or directorates and their relationship to the com-
pany whose limited partnership terms are offered.
I already have said that this type of liability was established through a
wide range of case law for purposes of holding responsible the initiators,
the founders, the controlling groups, the guarantors-those who profes-
sionally by their expertise guarantee the outer appearance of the prospec-
tus-and the managing director and shareholders of the general partner.
Often in these cases, one entity acts as a fiduciary limited partner who
then distributes set portions to the reinvestors. These fiduciary limited
partners may also be held liable.
Prospectus liability initially started by way of inclusion in our Stock
Exchange Act of 1908 due to fraud incurred stemming from the incorpo-
ration of various stock corporations in the early 1900s. General prospec-
tus liability, which still exists, is the core of a special prospectus liability
that is based on special rules.
In contrast to this type of liability, we also have a prospectus liability
that developed under our civil law standard. You would refer to this as a
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common law action that is not based on a specific clause. This was devel-
oped as prospectus liability for the grey capital markets which I men-
tioned previously. This really started with Investors Overseas Services
("IOS") which by way of a new distribution scheme came prominently
into Germany in the 1960s and then collapsed. This led to the introduc-
tion of specific prospectus requirements and prospectus liability for do-
mestic and foreign investment companies. We even had in our federal
legislature at that time, in 1969, a Draft Investment Protection Act
which was never discussed again.
During this period in the 1960s, investment companies became regu-
lated and much capital was available. Other areas of unregulated capital
markets then developed, and this was the beginning of the grey capital
markets, in particular with respect to tax driven limited partnerships,
because limited partnerships in our system are tax-wise transparent. Tax
losses of limited partnerships are attributed directly to each limited part-
ner. This is a very favorable way of calculating tax losses and tax savings
or tax haven schemes. One particular vehicle utilized was the GmbH &
Co. KG, a limited partnership in which the general partner has limited
liability. The general partner, however, in turn, is a limited liability com-
pany so that liability is limited further. What developed is what we call
public limited partnerships. I believe you may call this a master limited
partnership ("MLP"). You have developed, I understand, in some states
even liquid markets for MLP limited partnerships which we did not.
What happened is the courts started to develop a prospectus liability for
the offering and selling of limited partnership shares.
The basis for this is the theory of pre-contractual information and dis-
closure requirements, culpa in contrahendo. If somebody offers shares in
a limited partnership, he or she establishes pre-contractually a legal obli-
gation to, first, furnish accurate information and, second, to restore any
inaccuracies or not to omit any material facts. This basis for liability was
available to claimants and it was construed around the "privity of con-
tract," the pre-contractual relationship.
The real problem in our system is reaching the truly responsible par-
ties behind such limited partnerships. We have a fairly strict rule in Ger-
man corporate law that we only look at the legal form and do not pierce
the corporate veil. It was a major step for our investment protection
principles and for our courts to say, at a given moment, that they would
not look to the legal form but they would look to those who really initi-
ated, engineered, and controlled the limited partnership in question.
This liability was later extended to the general partner and the directors
of the general partner because, normally, they acted as a legal representa-
tive of the limited partnership.
By the same token, special expertise served as the basis for liability.
Therefore, any lawyer, tax advisor, accountant, bank, investment advi-
sor, evaluation expert, or other who held themselves out as experts in
connection with the offer of such limited partnerships shares could be
1993]
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held liable. That is one part of the prospectus liability I wanted to
mention.
The privity of contract concept, the pre-contractual element that we
have, allows only the first purchaser to bring a claim. The second pur-
chaser who bought from the first limited partner could not go back and
sue the initial controlling groups responsible for the fraud. The second
problem is that in these circumstances causality must be shown; the
claimant must prove that the misleading or omitted prospectus caused
not only the purchase, as such, but also, the damage now claimed. This
is a double causality requirement. The claimant, however, does not have
to prove intent or even gross negligence, mere negligence suffices. Addi-
tionally, joint and several liability can be established for all those partici-
pating in the scheme. This is important because there may be only one
deep pocket. The other defendants may have gone bankrupt or may have
left the country. Therefore, one tries to establish a deep pocket through
joint and several liability. The claimant can seek the negative interest; so,
the investor would have to be put in the position that he or she would
have occupied absent the purchase. The plaintiff cannot seek specific
performance.
Finally, there is a major problem with the statute of limitations. The
statute of limitations bars suits commenced later than six months from
the knowledge of the fact of the fraud or, at the latest, three years since
the purchase. If, however, there is a general contractual fiduciary rela-
tionship, as with banks for instance, then the statute of limitations appli-
cable to contracts controls-a statute of limitations of 30 years. As you
can see, in Germany, the issue often centers around the applicable statute
of limitations which, in turn, determines the alleged cause of action.
This is what we call the civil law/grey capital market oriented general
prospectus liability.
5. Prospectus Liability Under the German Stock Exchange
In addition to general prospectus liability, we have prospectus liability
contained in specific rules. The most prominent of these rules is the Ger-
man Stock Exchange Act; I will cite from its text in a moment. This
prospectus liability attaches only in circumstances of prospectuses which
were issued for admission to official quotation in Germany. That is a
very narrow area which you can see from the numbers that I gave you in
the beginning of my speech.
If a prospectus, on the basis of which securities have been listed for
official quotation, contains information material to the evaluation of
such securities which is incorrect, the persons who published the pro-
spectus and the persons who ordered its publication shall assume joint
and several liability towards any owner of such security in the amount
of the damage suffered by such holder arising from the factual position
being different from the information given, if those persons were aware
that the information was incorrect, or if they should, without gross
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negligence, have been aware that it was incorrect. The same shall ap-
ply if the prospectus is incomplete as a consequence of the omission of
relevant facts and this incompleteness is the consequence of malicious
concealment or of malicious failure by those who published the pro-
spectus or those who ordered its publication to conduct an adequate
examination.4
That is a fairly specific statement for our civil law system, yet it is
limited in scope; official quotation is addressed only in the admission pro-
cedure, not in capital formation. Possible defendants include the issuers,
the initiators of the issues, the bank which signs the prospectus, and all
other persons mentioned and somewhat attached to the prospectus.
These may include chartered accountants and perhaps lawyers if they
appear in the prospectus. If one reads the language carefully, one will see
that claims made under this rule could only be based upon purchases of
shares within Germany that were actually admitted for official quotation,
if that claim is causally connected to the misleading prospectus. This is
outdated; nonetheless, in Germany, we have never tried a case concern-
ing a purchase of securities effected outside Germany.
The second problem with this prospectus liability lies in the two differ-
ent standards of negligence. If you reread the clause above you will no-
tice that there are two different standards of negligence-thus, it is
significant whether or not a claim is based upon inaccurate facts that
were known, or by virtue of gross negligence that was not known. In the
case of incompleteness of facts, a claimant would have to show malicious
concealment. Malice is a stricter standard than gross negligence or mali-
cious failure to disclose.
In addition, the liable party may satisfy its remedial obligations by
repurchasing the securities in question in exchange for reimbursement of
the purchase price actually paid by the holder of these securities or the
official price of the securities at the time of the introduction. Thus, the
liable party has the right to either pay damages or to simply repay the
purchase price. The statute of limitations precludes any claims filed five
years after admission to listing. In relation to other claims, it is clear that
normal civil law claims, like your common law actions, are not excluded.
An interesting question arises that I pose to Rule lOb-5. In Germany,
a person can bring an action against the State or State officials if they do
not perform their functions based on a theory of liability of the State.
The question is whether regulatory commissions or stock exchanges
themselves could be held liable on the theory of non-performance of their
duties as state officials in the case of the admission of securities based on
an improper prospectus. As far as I am aware, in Germany, this has
never been litigated, but I wonder if this could be done in the United
States.
4. BbrsG § 45 (Stock Exchange Act). For translated text, see infra Annex.
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6. Prospectus Liability Under Paragraph 77 of the Stock
Exchange Act
The aforementioned Stock Exchange Act rules are extended to what
we call semi-official listing on the regulated markets. A market segment
on the Stock Exchanges requires stocks certificates and is consequently
very minimal in its reach. According to paragraph 77 of the Stock Ex-
change Act, this prospectus liability extends also to business reports
which are required for listing on the regulated market.
7. Prospectus Liability Under Section 13 of the Selling
Prospectus Act
There is an extension of these Stock Exchange Act rules in a new act
concerning the public offering and selling of securities that are not listed
on a stock exchange. This new act, the Selling Prospectus Act, became
law in 1989 and was based on an EC directive. Until 1990, we had no
rules dealing with prospectus requirements for securities not listed in the
official market or the regulated market. This Act introduces the require-
ments for publishing such a prospectus. A few of the requirements read
as follows:
For securities which are offered to the public for the first time within
the Federal Republic of Germany and which are not admitted to trad-
ing on a German stock exchange, a prospectus shall be published by
the person making the offer, unless otherwise provided in [sections] 2
through 4.5
This mandate was new to us in Germany and introduces some way for
capital market regulation.
This statute outlines the required contents of the prospectus as follows:
If in respect of the securities offered to the public an application for
admission to official listing on a German stock exchange has not been
made, the prospectus shall contain the information which is necessary
to enable the public to make a proper assessment of the issuer and the
securities being offered. 6
These are our basic principles for prospectuses. Paragraph 13 of the Sell-
ing Prospectus Act makes reference to the Stock Exchange Act rules in
the case of inaccurate or incomplete prospectuses.
8. Prospectus Liability for Domestic and Foreign Investment Funds
We have two further instances of technical prospectus liability, as I
mentioned earlier, embodied in our Domestic Investment Companies Act
and the Foreign Investment Companies Act. Under both acts, invest-
ment companies, whether domestic or foreign, have to issue a prospectus.
5. Selling Prospectus Act § 1. For translated text, see infra Annex.
6. Selling Prospectus Act § 7. For translated text, see infra Annex.
7. See Selling Prospectus Act § 13. For translated text, see infra Annex.
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It is their duty to issue a prospectus if they want to distribute the invest-
ment shares in Germany. In the case of false or incomplete representa-
tions or information in the prospectus, the possible defendants include
the investment company, all sellers or distributors, and all brokers and
dealers. Therefore, not only is the issuer of the prospectus liable, but also
all parties comprising the entire distribution chain are liable. This type
of liability, however, requires negligence.
As for the remedies, the claimant is entitled to the repayment of the
purchase price plus costs incurred in exchange for the investment shares.
If the claimant has resold the investment shares, the claimant is only
entitled to the difference between the original purchase price and the re-
sale price, if any. As you can see, the remedies are not very elaborate
under this theory.
9. Criminal Liability
Additionally, we have criminal liability in certain circumstances for
investment fraud. Our Criminal Code has only explicitly penalized in-
vestment fraud since 1986. This provision, paragraph 264a of the Crimi-
nal Code,' has not been largely used. I will not recite this clause which is
included in the Annex. It deals with securities, subscription rights, and
shares that grant participation in the outcome of an enterprise-this, in
our parlance, means not only stock certificates but any kind of equity
participation which grants participation rights in profits; thus, all kinds
of investment vehicles are covered. Furthermore, certain criminal of-
fenses, embodied in our Stock Exchange Act, relate mostly to manipula-
tion of stock prices.
10. Bank Liability in Particular
Another aspect of our securities fraud laws that I would like to stress
is bank liability, which must be viewed in the light of our universal bank-
ing system. Rule lOb-5 analogues, of course, are found in our universal
banking system. These analogues are embodied in a mixture of informa-
tion and disclosure duties of a bank based on its contractual relation with
its customer, insider dealing notions, and trader and advisor rules.
a. Contractual Relationships Between Banks and Clients
First, there is an ongoing banking relationship whenever there is a
bank contract. These contracts are based partly on the standard terms
and conditions for banks which were just reformulated in Germany in
the beginning of 1993. Scholars have widely debated the reach of the
contractual obligations on information, advice, and disclosure incumbent
upon banks in relation to their clients. One thing is certain, namely, that
positively inaccurate information by a bank renders that bank liable. The
8. StGb § 264a (Penal Code). For translated text, see infra Annex.
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standard for this type of liability is based on the level of sophistication of
the bank customer and the sophistication of the transaction in question.
The bank is liable in accordance with general rules for its bank em-
ployees and directors. The question remains whether there is a require-
ment of special diligence for banks. This is unclear in German case law.
b. Conflicts of Interests Within the Universal Banking System
Secondly, we come to the more important field of conflicts of interests
within our universal banking system. Our banks may act as underwrit-
ers, issuers, agents, or distributors within or without the stock exchanges.
They act as dealers and traders on and off the stock exchanges. They act
as custodians; they have their own deposit accounts for stock. They so-
licit proxies for representation in general assemblies of the corporations
whose stocks they hold on their own account or in custody. They are
allowed to trade on their own account. They can trade as agents for their
customers. If the bank itself is a stock corporation, it may also deal in its
own shares both on behalf of itself and its customers.
c. Price Development of Securities by Banks
In addition, if it is participating in the issuance of equity, traditionally,
a bank will take care of the price development of a security on the stock
exchange. This is not forbidden; it is not a manipulation. We call it
Kurspflege. So, now you can envision the potential for conflicts of inter-
est in our banking system. If a customer comes into a bank and wants to
sell some shares at price X, and the bank itself is active in price stabiliza-
tion, or the bank is about to sell a block of those shares on the stock
market, or the bank is considering disposing of these stocks or just devel-
oping these stocks, whose interest will the bank put first? Moreover,
banks in our system, if they act for customers, may execute the order
either as an agent on the stock exchange, or they may act as a principal
and turn around as the other party. This is a fairly conflict laden situa-
tion for which we do not yet have definite answers in Germany, and it is
an area which is particularly alluded to here.
The investment banker with whom I spoke last night said that because
Germany does not have a Rule lOb-5, there is a potential for conflict. I
responded that we do not have any inside problems or conflicts of inter-
ests because we tend to define ourselves in total as one big (inside) group.
German doctrine recommends that one weigh the different interests in
each case. Ideally, however, one would want to separate the different
functions of the banks. This is not yet accepted. In practice, a combina-
tion of weighing of interests in particular cases occurs, such as the con-
flict between a bank and its customer or conflicts which arise for the
bank because different customers give different orders.
We have three principles that are then put together: (1) the priority
principle, (2) the parity principle, and (3) the equity principle. One
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should distribute scarce resources evenly based on a combination of these
principles. This is certainly a difficult area.
The same types of conflict arise in a situation where banks give invest-
ment advice. If they themselves intend to sell a block of shares on the
stock exchange, should they tell the customer who wants to order a sale
or purchase of such shares? The bank has to act in the best interest of
the customer. But, can you force the bank to disclose to its customer its
business policy? Traditionally, we say no; there is no duty to disclose
such policies.
The second problem is bank secrecy which, in Germany, is not based
on statutes, but on contract. Can the banks really go to a customer and
inform him or her that other customers have just dumped their securi-
ties? No, this would be a violation of the bank secrecy. A bank is, of
course, free to engage concurrently in different contractual situations.
The conflict must then be resolved by the bank that has conflicting con-
tracts with different customers. In practice, however, this is a problem
that is unresolved.
d. Execution of Orders
The position of banks in the execution of orders must also be ex-
amined. Assume there are colliding orders of customers-one customer
wants to sell, the other wants to buy. What does the bank do? Does it
execute in time priority? Does it match these two? Does it wait and see
the rate and prices development? There are, as you can see, a variety of
conflicts in the execution stage. One thing again is clear; if a customer
gives special instructions, then, of course, the bank is to follow these in-
structions. Otherwise it may act as an agent or it may match the order
itself.
e. Codes of Conduct
We have tried to cope with these potential conflicts in Germany, until
today, with voluntary, non-binding codes of conducts, the Rules for
Traders and Advisors. These codes were established by a committee of
experts at the Federal Ministry of Finance consisting of members of
trade associations and professional associations, and in particular, the
German Association of Banks. These rules are binding only to the extent
they are explicitly acknowledged in writing by the individual. These
rules do not really carry any sanctions except for deletion from the list of
traders. The Rules for Traders and Advisors reads as follows:
Banks trading securities which are admitted for official quotation on a
domestic stock exchange or for trading on the regulated market, or
which are publicly offered with reference to the intended introduction
to a domestic stock exchange, may a) not recommend transactions for
reasons which are not in the interest of the customer, in particular they
may not make recommendations for the purpose of reducing or in-
creasing the own holdings of the bank, the bank's managers or the
1993]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
employees working and trading or advisory departments..., or for the
purpose of influencing the quotation of securities for the benefit of
dealings of such person on their own behalf, b) not effect transactions
on their own behalf based on a customer's order for the purchase or
sale of securities which result in quotations which are disadvantageous
for the customer.9
f. Protection of Bank Customers Post Execution
The final problem in this area is the protection of bank customers after
the execution of orders. The issue is this: if a bank executes orders of
customers at a certain price, can it then immediately thereafter dump its
own stock in the market so that the prices go down significantly? Or, can
a bank, that has given a customer specific advice to sell, continue to buy
if the stocks go up? If prices increase for a while, the bank reaps profits.
This is what we call a "post execution problem."
I thought I would dwell on this type of bank liability a bit longer be-
cause this seems to be an area where Rule lOb-5 practices in the United
States might be particularly relevant to us. But, again, the German
banker would partly answer this by noting that we do have, in fact, com-
pliance officers and compliance procedures which try to erect, if not Chi-
nese walls, then, at least, mechanisms which make the advisory functions
separable from the execution functions and from the bank's own deal-
ings. This is, however, as I said earlier, not really controllable.
11. Insider Trading
One important area in which there is a relation between Rule 1Ob-5
and German analogues is insider trading. I understand that Rule lOb-5
is still the most important mechanism in the area of insider trading in the
United States despite the existence of other specific insider trading rules.
To reiterate, at the present time in Germany, we only have had a volun-
tary system of insider trading rules which are not binding except for ex-
plicit written acknowledgement with virtually no sanctions attaching.
We do have some new developments, though, and insider trading is a
very good field in which one can trace a direct legal parentage to the
United States and to Rule lOb-5.
In the early 1970s, we Continentals became aware of the United States'
insider trading laws. In particular, France did away with the self regula-
tory non-binding system at a very early stage.
Presently, we do have a statutory instrument that is largely forgotten
or maybe not really acknowledged. The Convention on Insider Trading
was formulated under the auspices of the Council of Europe and then
opened for signature. It actually entered into force some months ago.
This Convention defines the terms "insider," "insider information," and
"inside security." Moreover, it stipulates the cooperation between the
9. Rules for Traders and Advisors § 1. For translated text, see infra Annex.
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countries ratifying the Convention. The Convention is open not only to
all members of the Council of Europe, which includes the twelve mem-
bers of the EC, but also to the other Western Europeans states, as well as
the Eastern Europeans states, which are in the process of ratifying it.
Thus, the Council of Europe's Insider Convention will have a definite
significance, particularly with respect to the Eastern and Central Euro-
pean States.
The second matter in the area of insider trading that I would like to
mention, is the EC Insider Directive in its final form of 1989. Some
member states have partly implemented this directive. Although, it was
due to be implemented by June 1992, a few states are delinquent, includ-
ing Germany.
Again, included in the Draft Act establishing our Federal Securities
Agencies is a part on insider trading which has not yet been publicly
discussed. Thus, we will have insider trading rules and sanctions in a
short time. These rules and sanctions will closely follow the EC Insider
Directive. In particular, we will have primary and secondary insider lia-
bility. Additionally, the scope of inside information will be fairly large. I
will leave this for further discussion.
Let me just reiterate, as a final conclusion, that the grey capital mar-
kets that we have in Germany will most likely remain unregulated, and
will be governed by case law. I can not foresee whether these grey capital
markets will also be under the market supervision of the Federal Securi-
ties Agency. It appears as if we will have a large area which remains
outside federal supervision.
Where will we go in Germany? It will be up to the Federal Securities
Agency that will still have to grapple with the demarcation of the super-
vision of banking activity, under the auspices of the Federal Banking
Agencies, from the new securities market supervision.
CONCLUSION
Of course, there are other Western European relatives to Rule lOb-5
that are too numerous to mention. You can proceed on the assumption
that basically all of the Western European states in the meantime do have
some kind of central regulatory authority. In France, Spain, and Italy,
there are stock exchange committees; in Belgium, there is the Banking
Commission; in contrast, in Holland, the Amsterdam Stock Exchange is
in charge of supervision; in the United Kingdom, under the Financial
Services Act, a variety of self-governing bodies supervise activities on and
off the stock exchanges.
With regard to the EC Commission, I want to reiterate that there is no
legislative or regulatory power of the EC Commission, as such. The EC
Commission issued recommendations for securities transactions and a
code of conduct relating to securities transactions in 1975. The Code of
Conduct is very explicit and very smooth, but, again, it is not binding. It
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is a voluntary set of rules. What we have also seen, and what may also be
important, is that the EC entered into several cooperation agreements
with other enforcement agencies, such as the SEC. You may be aware of
the fact that in September 1991, EC Commissioner Sir Leon Brittain and
SEC Chairman Richard Breeden signed a Cooperation Memorandum on
cooperation in the field of securities, in particular, with respect to market
transparency and mutual help in detecting market insufficiencies.
The EC Commission will deal in the future with global custody, with
investment services, and with clearing systems. It is my view that it will
not deal with comprehensive securities acts or other undertakings at this
time. So, on that level, you can proceed on the assumption that we will
continue to have 12 separate legal systems, all with a common minimum
standard being introduced by way of EC directives.
Now having made this little survey of the German and European rela-
tives, my final question would be to Rule lOb-5: "When do you come
over to visit us, and in particular, when do you come over to visit your
more distant cousins in the East?" In this perspective, all that has been
developed here in the United States might find its way not only into
Western Europe but also into Eastern Europe. These developments may
find their way to the East for two reasons. One, the Eastern European
countries look for guidance to the West in establishing their own capital
markets. They look in the first place to the EC, because they have aspira-
tions to become members at a given time or to be associated closely with
the EC. They try to anticipate or try to correspondingly implement,
without being members, the EC legislation in the securities and banking
fields. Second, they have very good relations with the United States.
The U.S. has sent over hosts of advisors, including private practice law-
yers, SEC personnel, and professionals of other backgrounds, such as in-
vestment bankers. They all try to bring their ideas of capital markets and
securities fraud to these states and emerging markets. Soon a visit might
be warranted, dear cousin.
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ANNEX
This Annex includes German law provisions in English translation as
well as the Insider Convention and the Insider Directive referenced in
the address.*
Act Against Unfair Competition ("UWG")
§ 1. [General clause] A claim for negligence or for damages may be
made against any person who, for the purposes of competition, indulges
in activities which offend against common decency/public policy.
§ 3. [Misleading information] A claim for omission of information may
be made against any person who, in commercial activities, for the pur-
poses of competition, provides misleading information on business condi-
tions, in particular on the quality, the origin, the manufacture and the
pricing of individual goods or of commercial services or of the entire
range, on price lists, on the form of purchase or on the source from
which goods are purchased, on the possession of awards, on the reason or
on the purpose of the sale or on the quantity of stock.
§ 13a [Right to termination in the event of false and misleading promo-
tional information]
(1) Any purchaser who was encouraged to make its purchase by false
promotional information, which information is likely to be misleading
within the terms of § 4, and which is, for that public for which it is in-
tended, material to the conclusion of contracts, shall be entitled to termi-
nate the contract. If the promotional material which contains this
information was issued by a third party, the purchaser shall have the
right to terminate the contract only if the other party to the contract was
aware, or should have been aware, that the information was false and was
likely to be misleading or has itself taken action to associate itself with
the promotional material which contains this information.
(2) Notice of termination shall be submitted to the other party to the
contract immediately after the purchaser has gained knowledge of those
circumstances upon which its termination is based. The right to termina-
tion shall lapse, if it is not exercised within a period of six months from
the conclusion of the contract. It is not possible to contract out of this
right in advance.
(3) For movables, the consequences of the termination are governed
by § 3, paras. 1, 3 and 4 and by § 5, para. 3, sentence I of the Act for the
Revocation of Door-to-Door Sales and of similar Transactions. The as-
sertion of further claims for damages is not excluded. If the promotional
* The English translations of the German law provisions were prepared by Dr. Ger-
hard Wegen and Glyn Haggett, Gleiss, Lutz, Hootz, Hirsch & Partners, Stuttgart. The
European Council Insider Convention and the EC Insider Directive have been repro-
duced from the official English text. The Insider Trading Guidelines and the Rules for




material was issued by a third party, the third party shall, within the
relationship between the other party to the contract and itself, assume
sole liability for the damages, unless the other party to the contract was
aware of the contravention.
German Civil Code ("BGB")
§ 823. [Liability to compensate for damages]
(1) Any person who, wilfully or negligently, unlawfully injures the
life, body, health, freedom, property or other right of another, shall be
obliged to compensate it for any damage arising therefrom.
(2) The same obligation shall be imposed upon any person who con-
travenes a law which is intended to provide protection for others. If the
content of that law is such as to permit its contravention without fault,
the obligation to make compensation shall arise only in the event of fault.
Stock Exchange Act ("BdrsG")
§ 45 [Liability for false prospectuses]
(1) If a prospectus, on the basis of which securities have been listed
for official quotation, contains information material to the evaluation of
such securities which is incorrect, the persons who published the pro-
spectus and the persons who ordered its publication shall assume joint
and several liability towards any owner of such a security in the amount
of the damage suffered by such holder arising from the factual position
being different from the information given, if those persons were aware
that the information was incorrect, or if they should, without gross negli-
gence, have been aware that it was incorrect. The same shall apply if the
prospectus is incomplete as a consequence of the omission of relevant
facts and this incompleteness is the consequence of malicious conceal-
ment or of malicious failure by those who published the prospectus or
those who ordered its publication to conduct an adequate examination.
(2) The liability cannot be excluded by an indication in the prospec-
tus to the effect that the information was supplied by a third party.
§ 46 [Extent of the liability to indemnify]
(1) The liability to indemnify covers only those securities which were
listed on the basis of the prospectus and which were acquired by the
holder in a domestic transaction.
(2) The person liable to indemnify can fulfill his liability by acquiring
the security from the holder either against payment of the price which
the holder can prove it paid, or against payment of the market price of
the security at the time of listing.
(3) The liability to indemnify is excluded if the holder of the securi-
ties knew, at the time of acquisition, that the information in the prospec-
tus was incorrect or incomplete. The same shall apply if the holder of
the securities should have realized, by exercising, at the time of the acqui-
sition, the diligence usually employed in its own affairs, that the informa-
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tion in the prospectus was incorrect, unless the liability to indemnify is
based upon malicious conduct.
§ 47 [Limitation of claims to indemnification]
Any claims to indemnification shall become barred five years after the
securities are listed.
§ 48 [Invalidity of agreements concerning exclusion of liability]
(1) Any agreement by which liability pursuant to §§ 45 through 47 is
restricted or excluded shall be null and void.
(2) Further claims which may be asserted under a contract pursuant
to the provisions of civil law shall remain unaffected.
§ 77 [Incomplete information]
If the information in the business report is incorrect or incomplete, the
provisions of §§ 45 through 49 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
§ 88 [Fraudulent manipulation of the exchange or market price]
A prison term of up to three years or a fine shall be imposed on a
person who, in order to manipulate the exchange or market price of se-
curities, subscription rights, commodities or interests which shall grant a
participation in the results of an enterprise,
1. makes false statements on circumstances material for appraisal of
the securities, subscription rights, goods or interests, or conceals such
facts in violation of existing regulations, or
2. otherwise employs fraudulent means.
§ 89 [Usurious inducement to exchange speculation]
(1) A prison term of up to three years or a fine shall be imposed on a
person who commercially induces others, by taking advantage of their
inexperience in speculative exchange transactions, to such transactions or
to direct or indirect participation in such transactions.
(2) Speculative exchange transactions within the meaning of subpar-
agraph (1) are in particular
1. purchasing or selling transactions with deferred delivery date,
also when concluded outside a domestic or foreign exchange,
2. options on such transactions, which are directed at a realiza-
tion of a profit on the difference between the price agreed for deliv-
ery and the actual exchange or market price at the time of delivery.
Stock Exchange Admission Regulation ("BdrsZulVO")
§ 14 Information about Persons or Companies which assume Liability
for the Contents of the Prospectus
The prospectus shall state the names and the position, in the case of
legal entities and companies the name and domicile, of those persons or
companies which shall assume liability for the contents of the prospectus;
it shall contain a statement to the effect that, to their knowledge, the
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information given is correct and no material information has been
omitted.
Selling Prospectus Act
§ 1 Principle Rule.
For securities which are offered to the public for the first time within
the Federal Republic of Germany and which are not admitted to trading
on a german stock exchange, a prospectus shall be published by the per-
son making the offer, unless otherwise provided for in §§ 2 through 4.
§ 7 Contents of Prospectus.
(1) If in respect of securities offered to the public an application for
admission to official listing on a German stock exchange has not been
made, the prospectus shall contain the information which is necessary to
enable the public to make a proper assessment of the issuer and the se-
curities being offered.
(2) The Federal Government shall be authorized to issue by regula-
tion, which shall require the consent of the Federal Council, such provi-
sions as are necessary for the protection of the public on the required
contents of the prospectus, in particular in respect of:
1. the persons or companies assuming responsibility for the con-
tents of the prospectus;
2. the securities being offered; and
3. the issuer of the securities and its capital, activities, assets and
liabilities, financial position, profits and losses, management and su-
pervisory bodies, and prospects of business.
(3) The regulation pursuant to subsection (2) may include provisions
regarding exemptions permitting the omission from the prospectus of
certain information:
1. if special circumstances exist with respect to the issuer, the
securities being offered, their issuance, or the circle of investors at
which the issue is directed, and the interests of the public are suffi-
ciently safeguarded by other means of information; or
2. in view of the minor relevance of that information or if disclo-
sure of that information would result in substantial damage to the
issuer.
§ 13 Inaccurate Prospectus.
If information contained within a prospectus is inaccurate or incom-
plete, the provisions of §§ 45 through 48 of the Stock Exchange Act shall
apply analogously, except that a claim for compensation of damages shall
be barred upon the expiration of five years following the publication of
the prospectus.
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Investment Company Act ("KAGG")
§ 20 [Statements in prospectuses; inaccuracy of prospectuses]
(1) If a sales prospectus (§ 19) contains information material to the
evaluation of share certificates which is inaccurate or incomplete, any
person who has based its decision to purchase such share certificates
upon that sales prospectus shall be entitled to request the investment
company and those who sold those share certificates commercially on
their own behalf to re-purchase, as joint and several debtors, those share
certificates at the price which it paid. If, at the time the purchaser be-
comes aware that the information in the sales prospectus is inaccurate or
incomplete, that purchaser is no longer in possession of the share certifi-
cate, it shall be entitled to request payment of that sum by which the
price it paid for the share exceeds the redemption price of the share at the
time at which it sold that share.
(2) Those documents required to be attached to the prospectus, pur-
suant to § 19, para. 1, sentence 2, shall be deemed to constitute informa-
tion material to evaluation within the terms of paragraph 1.
(3) A claim cannot be made against an investment company or an
enterprise which sold the share certificates on its own behalf commer-
cially if that investment company or that enterprise is able to prove that
it was not aware that the information in the sales prospectus was inaccu-
rate or incomplete, and if the lack of knowledge does not result from
gross negligence. A claim cannot be made on the basis of paragraph 1, if
the purchaser of the share certificates was aware, when it made the
purchase, of the fact that the information in the sales prospectus was
inaccurate or incomplete.
(4) Any person who, in full knowledge of the fact that the informa-
tion in the sales prospectus is inaccurate or incomplete, acts as a com-
mercial agent for the sale of share certificates or sells those share
certificates on behalf of a third party, shall be subject to that obligation to
repurchase the share certificates which is contained within paragraph 1.
A claim cannot be made on the basis of paragraph 1, if the purchaser of
the share certificates was also aware, when it made the purchase, that the
information in the sales prospectus was inaccurate or incomplete.
(5) The claim shall become barred six months after that time at
which the purchaser becomes aware of the fact that the sales prospectus
is inaccurate or incomplete, and at the latest three years after the
purchase contract is concluded.
Foreign Investment Companies Act ("AIG"):
§ 12
(1) If a sales prospectus (§ 3) contains information material to the
evaluation of foreign investments which is inaccurate or incomplete, any
person who has based its decision to purchase investment shares upon
that sales prospectus shall be entitled to request the foreign investment
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company, the management company and the distribution company to re-
purchase, as joint and several debtors, those investment shares at the
price which it paid. If, at the time the purchaser becomes aware that the
information in the sales prospectus is inaccurate or incomplete, that pur-
chaser is no longer in possession of the shares, it shall be entitled to re-
quest payment of that sum by which the price it paid for the shares
exceeds the redemption price of the shares at the time at which it sold
those shares.
(2) That information in prospectuses required by § 3, para. 2,
sentences 2 and 3, shall be deemed to constitute information material to
evaluation within the terms of paragraph 1.
(3) A claim cannot be made against a company pursuant to para-
graph I if that company is able to prove that it was not aware that the
information in the sales prospectus was inaccurate or incomplete, and if
the lack of knowledge does not result from gross negligence. A claim
cannot be made on the basis of paragraph 1, if the purchaser of the in-
vestment shares was aware, when it made the purchase, of the fact that
the information in the sales prospectus was inaccurate or incomplete.
(4) Any person who, in full knowledge of the fact that the informa-
tion in the sales prospectus is inaccurate or incomplete, acts as a com-
mercial agent for the sale of shares or sells those shares on behalf of a
third party, shall be subject to that obligation to repurchase the shares
which is contained within paragraph 1. A claim cannot be made on the
basis of paragraph 1, if the purchaser of the shares was also aware, when
it made the purchase, that the information in the sales prospectus was
inaccurate or incomplete.
(5) The claim shall become barred six months after that time at
which the purchaser becomes aware of the fact that the sales prospectus
is inaccurate or incomplete, and at the latest three years after the
purchase contract is concluded.
German Penal Code ("StGB")
§ 264a Fraud in Capital Investments
(1) Any person who, in conjunction with
1. The sale of securities, subscription rights, or shares which
grant a participation in the profits of an enterprise, or
2. An offer to increase investments in the aforementioned shares
provides to a larger group of people incorrect, positive information
or withholds detrimental facts in prospectuses, or in fact sheets or in
statements on the assets, which information and facts relate to cir-
cumstances material to the decision on acquisition of shares, or to
that on the increase of investments in shares, shall be subject to a
prison sentence of up to three years or to a fine.
(2) The foregoing paragraph shall also apply if the crime is related to
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shares in assets which an enterprise is administrating in its own name but
for the account of another.
(3) Any person who wilfully prevents the performance of that service
which is dependent upon the acquisition of, or upon the increase of in-
vestments in shares, shall not be subject to punishment pursuant to pa-
ras. 1 and 2. If the service is not performed without the assistance of the
offender, the offender shall be exempt from punishment if it makes a wil-
ful and genuine attempt to prevent the performance of the service.
Insider Trading Guidelines
§1
(1) Insiders are not permitted at any time or in any manner to enter
into, or to cause others to enter into, transactions in Insider Securities
based on the use of Insider Information obtained by reason of his/her
professional position for his/her own benefit or for the benefit of any
third person. They are also prohibited from passing on Insider Informa-
tion to persons who are not Insiders unless such Insider Information is
passed on pursuant to a provision of law or in order to preserve justified
interests.
(2) The following shall not be subject (1):
a) Transactions executed as a result of instructions. The responsi-
bility of the person giving such instructions shall not be affected
hereby;
b) Transactions within the scope of the objects of the enterprise
specified in the articles of incorporation for the purposes of cor-
porate planning of such enterprise or any of the enterprises speci-
fied in § 2(2);
c) Transactions entered into in compliance with customers' inter-
ests or within the scope of the otherwise customary securities
trading business of the bank.
§2
(1) Insider means:
a) legal representatives and members of the supervisory board of
such corporation;
b) legal representatives and members of the supervisory board of
affiliated domestic enterprises, unless they would in the ordinary
course of business not as such obtain knowledge of Insider
Information;
c) shareholders, including their legal representatives and members
of their board of directors, provided they hold more than 25% of
the shares of such corporation; § 16(4) of the German Stock Cor-
poration Act shall apply mutatis mutandis;
d) employees of the corporation, of domestic enterprises affiliated
with such corporation, and the shareholders of such corporation
holding more than 25% of such corporation, provided that such
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employees as such in the ordinary course of business obtain
knowledge of Insider Information;
e) agents of a corporation who in connection with their agency
function in the ordinary course of business obtain knowledge of
Insider Information;
f) banks and the members of their supervisory boards, general man-
agers, employees and agents, which or who have been retained in
connection with any of the actions referred to in sentence 3 of (3)
or in connection with lending business and, in connection there-
with, in the ordinary course of business obtain knowledge of In-
sider Information.
(2) Insider Securities shall mean:
shares of stock, participation rights, convertible bonds, bonds with
warrants, profit participation certificates, warrants, and subscription
rights which are issued
a) by the corporation,
b) by a domestic enterprise affiliated with the corporation pursuant
to §§ 17, 18 or 291 of the German Stock Corporation Act,
c) by a domestic enterprise, or a domestic enterprise affiliated with
such domestic enterprise, associated with the corporation by way
of a domination agreement or profit and loss transfer agreement
(Beherrschungs- oder Gewinnabfilrungsvertrag), by way of a
tender or buyout offer (Ubernahme- oder Abfindungsangebot),
by consolidation, merger, transfer of assets or change of corpo-
rate status,
and which are admitted for official quotation or for trading on the
regulated market (geregelter Markt) at a domestic stock exchange. A
public offer of securities together with a statement to the effect that such
securities are intended to be admitted to a domestic stock exchange shall
be deemed equivalent to the admission to a domestic stock exchange.
Subscription rights for Insider Securities shall also be deemed to be In-
sider Securities.
(3) Insider Information is knowledge of circumstances not yet dis-
closed or publicly known which could affect the valuation of the Insider
Securities. Such information shall include knowledge of a change of divi-
dend payments, of substantial changes in earnings or liquidity or of mate-
rial circumstances which have or could have an effect thereon. Insider
Information shall furthermore include knowledge of the following pro-
posed actions:
a) capital decrease or raising of capital including a capital increase
out of corporate funds;
b) entering into a domination or profit and loss transfer agreement;
c) tender offer or buyout offer;
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§3
Violations of § 1 shall be investigated pursuant to the "Rules of Proce-
dure of the Investigation Commissions Established at the Stock Ex-
changes pursuant to the Insider Trading Guidelines and the Rules for
Traders and Advisers of July 1, 1976" by the relevant investigation com-
mission. The person subject to an investigation shall provide all informa-
tion required by the person commissioned with such investigations by the
investigation commission. He shall also specify all banks at which In-
sider Securities are on deposit for his benefit or which have traded or
kept on deposit for him any Insider Securities during the time period to
which such investigation relates; furthermore, such banks shall be re-
leased by him from their obligation to maintain confidentiality as to all
transactions which occurred in connection with Insider Securities of the
person subject to such investigation, in connection with the providing of
information pursuant to sentence 2.
§4
(1) Any further civil law consequences notwithstanding, Insiders and
the enterprises for whose benefit they have acted shall transfer to the
corporation any benefits derived from violations of § 1; § 88(3) of the
German Stock Corporation Act shall apply mutatis mutandis. In the
case of Insiders pursuant to § 2(l)(O, the corporation whose Insider Se-
curities were subject to an insider transaction in violation of § 1 shall be
entitled to any such benefits (§ 328 of the German Civil Code).
(2) If such obligation to transfer is not complied with, then the cor-
poration entitled pursuant to (1) shall assert such claim in court unless
under the circumstances the assets of the person who is liable are insuffi-
cient or any other material reason to the contrary exists.
(3) The enterprise shall take reasonable measures against such In-
sider independent of the transfer obligation pursuant to (1).
§5
(1) The corporations shall cause the Insiders within their sphere to
submit themselves to the Insider Trading Guidelines and the Rules of
Procedure referred to in § 3, sentence 1, as well as the respective
comments.
(2) The banks referred to in § 2(l)(f) submit themselves vis-a-vis
their respective associations to the Insider Trading Guidelines and the
Rules of Procedure referred to in § 3, sentence 1, as well as to the respec-
tive comments as binding for themselves. Unless already done so pursu-
ant to (1), they shall cause the members of the supervisory boards,
general managers, employees and agents referred to in § 2(l)(f) to recog-
nize the Insider Trading Guidelines and the Rules of Procedure referred
to in § 3, sentence 1.
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Rules for Traders and Advisers
§1
Banks trading securities which are admitted to official quotation on a
domestic stock exchange or for trading on the regulated market, or
which are publicly offered with reference to the intended introduction to
a domestic stock exchange, may
a) not recommend transactions for reasons which are not in the in-
terest of the customer; in particular they may not make recom-
mendations for the purpose of reducing or increasing the own
holdings of the bank, the bank's managers or the employees
working in trading or advisory departments (hereinafter the "em-
ployees"), or for the purpose of influencing the quotation of se-
curities for the benefit of dealings of such persons on their own
behalf;
b) not effect transactions on their own behalf based on a customer's
order for the purchase or sale of securities which result in quota-
tions which are disadvantageous for the customer.
The same applies to bank managers or employees of banks.
§2
Violations of § 1 are investigated by the competent review commission in
accordance with the "Rules of Procedure of the Investigation Commis-
sions at the Stock Exchanges pursuant to the Insider Trading Guidelines
and the Rules for Traders and Advisers of July 1, 1976." The entity or
person whose conduct is investigated has to give all required information
to those who have been invested with the mandate by the Investigation
Commission to conduct the investigations. They also have to name all
banks with which they have deposited securities, or which, during the
time investigated, have traded securities for them, or which have kept
securities in deposit for them; furthermore, they have to exempt such
banks from the obligation of complying with the banking secrecy require-
ments in connection with the release of information referred to in the
second sentence of this § 2 with respect to business transactions which
relate to securities with the person involved in the investigation.
§3
The banks will cause the bank managers and employees to recognize con-
tractually the Rules for Traders and Advisers and the Rules of Procedure
referred to in § 2, sentence 1, and the relevant comments.
§4
Business enterprises and persons who, without being a bank, are involved
in investment advice on a commercial basis (hereinafter "investment ad-
visers") may by written declaration to the Federation of German Stock
Exchanges submit themselves to the regulations set forth in §§ I through
3. The Federation will inform the stock exchanges about the statements
submitted to it. The stock exchanges shall publish such declarations in
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the official quotation gazettes and will maintain a list of the respective
investment advisers.
§5
If investment advisers who are on the list willfully violate the Rules, the
Federation of German Stock Exchanges may cause their deletion from
the list. The stock exchanges will publish such deletion in the official
quotation gazettes.
§6
Possible civil or criminal consequences of violations of these regulations
are not affected. Willful violations of bank managers and employees of
§ 1 of these regulations constitute actions which, with respect to stock
exchange regulations, are not compatible with the honor of a merchant
or the claim based on merchant's faith.
II. COUNCIL OF EUROPE
A. Convention on Insider Trading Opened for Signature on April 20,
1989 (Parliamentary Assembly 27 January 1989, Doc. 5993
Addendum).
PREAMBLE
The member states of the Council of Europe, signatories hereto,
Considering that the aim of the Council is to achieve a greater unity
between its members;
Considering that certain financial transactions in securities traded on
stock exchanges are carried out by persons seeking to avoid losses or to
make profits by using the privileged information available to them, thus
undermining equality of opportunity as between investors and the credi-
bility of the market;
Considering that such behavior is also proving dangerous for the econo-
mies of the member states concerned and in particular for the proper
functioning of the stock markets;
Considering that, because of the internationalization of markets and the
ease of present-day communications, operations of this nature are carried
out sometimes on the market of a state by persons not resident in that
State or acting through persons not resident there;
Considering that efforts to counter such practices which are already be-
ing made on the domestic level in many member states make it essential
to set up specific machinery to deal with these situations and coordinate
endeavors at international level;
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HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
Chapter I-Definitions
ARTICLE 1
1. For the purposes of this Convention an irregular operation of insider
trading means an irregular operation carried out by a person:
(a) who is the president or chairman, or a member of a board of
directors or other administrative or supervisory organ, or is the
authorized agent or in the employment of an issuer of securities,
and has effected or caused to be effected an operation on an or-
ganized stock market knowingly using information not yet dis-
closed to the public, the possession of which he obtained by
reason of his occupation and the disclosure of which was likely
to have a significant influence on the market, with a view to se-
curing an advantage for himself or a third party;
(b) who has entered into the transactions described above know-
ingly using not yet disclosed information which he obtained in
the performance of his duties or in the course of his occupation;
(c) who has entered into the transactions described above know-
ingly using not yet disclosed information communicated to him
by one of the persons mentioned in (a) or (b) above.
2. For the purposes of applying this Convention:
(a) the expression 'organized stock market' signifies stock markets
subject to regulations established by authorities recognized by
the government for the purpose;
(b) the term 'stock' signifies transferable securities issued according
to the national legislation of each Party by business firms or
companies or other issuers, where such securities may be bought
and sold on a market organized in accordance with the provi-
sions of paragraph (a) above, as well as other transferable securi-
ties admitted on that market in conformity with the national
rules applicable to it;
(c) the expression 'operation' signifies any act on an organized stock
market which gives or may give entitlement to stock as provided
for in paragraph (b) above.
Chapter II-Exchange of Information
ARTICLE 2
The Parties undertake, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter,
to provide each other with the greatest possible measure of mutual assist-
ance in the exchange of information relating to matters establishing or
giving rise to the belief that irregular operations of insider trading have
been carried out.
ARTICLE 3
Each Party may, by a declaration to the Secretary General of the Council
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of Europe, undertake to provide other Parties, subject to reciprocity,
with the greatest possible measure of mutual assistance in the exchange
of information necessary for the surveillance of operations carried out in
the organized stock markets which could adversely affect equal access to
information for all users of the stock market or the quality of the infor-
mation supplied to investors in order to ensure honest dealing.
ARTICLE 4
1. Each Party shall designate one or more authorities actually responsi-
ble for submitting any request for assistance, and for receiving and taking
action on requests for assistance from the corresponding authorities des-
ignated by each Party.
2. Each Party shall, in a declaration addressed to the Secretary General
of the Council of Europe, indicate the name and address of the authority
or authorities designated in accordance with the provisions of this article
and any modification thereto.
3. The Secretary General shall notify these declarations to the other
Parties.
ARTICLE 5
1. Reasons shall be given for making a request for assistance.
2. The request shall contain a description of the facts establishing or
giving rise to the belief that irregular operations of insider trading have
been carried out or, if assistance is requested according to the rules laid
down by Parties under article 3, reference to the principles mentioned in
that article which have been violated.
3. The request shall contain reference to the provisions by virtue of
which the operations are irregular in the state of the requesting
authority.
4. The request shall be in or translated into one of the official languages
of the state of the requested authority, or in one of the official languages
of the Council of Europe.
5. The request shall specify:
(a) the requesting authority and the requested authority;
(b) the information sought by the requesting authority, the persons
or bodies which may be in possession of it, or the place where it
may be available;
(c) the reasons for and the purpose of the requesting authority's ap-
plication, and the use it will make of the information under its
national law; and
(d) how soon a response is required and, in cases of urgency, the
reasons therefor.
ARTICLE 6
1. The execution of requests for assistance by the requested authority is
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carried out in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down by the
law of the Party in which that authority operates.
2. When the search for information so requires, and in the absence of
specific provisions, the rules laid down by national law for obtaining evi-
dence shall be capable of being applied by the requested authority or on
its behalf Sanctions laid down for breaches of professional secrecy shall
not apply in regard to the information provided compulsorily in the
course of enquiries.
3. These provisions shall not prejudice the rights accorded to the de-
fendant by national law.
4. Save to the extent strictly necessary to carry out the request, the
requested authority and the persons seeking the information requested
are bound to maintain secrecy about the request, the component parts of
the request and the information so gathered.
5. However, at the time of the designation of the authority, provided
for by article 4, each Party shall declare the derogations to the principle
set forth in paragraph 4 of this article possibly imposed or permitted by
national law:
- either to guarantee free access of citizens to the files of the
administration;
- or when the designated authority is obliged to denounce to other ad-
ministrative or judicial authorities information communicated or
gathered within the framework of the request;
- or, provided the requesting authority has been informed, to investi-
gate violations of the law of the requested Party or to secure compli-
ance with such law.
ARTICLE 7
1. The requesting authority may not use the information supplied for
purposes other than those set out in its request.
2. The requested authority may refuse to supply the requested informa-
tion or subsequently oppose its use for purposes set out in the request or
fix certain conditions unless:
(a) the facts are within the scope of article 1 and
(b) the purposes set out are in conformity with the aims defined in
article 2 and
(c) the facts constitute in each state an irregularity as regards the
rules of both states.
3. When the requesting authority wishes to use the information sup-
plied for purposes other than those set out in the initial request it must
inform in advance the requested authority who may refuse to consent to
such use unless the conditions in paragraph 2 above are fulfilled.
4. The information supplied may be used before a criminal court only
in cases where it could have been obtained by application of Chapter III.
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5. No authority of the requesting Party may use or transmit this infor-
mation for tax, customs or currency purposes unless otherwise provided
in a declaration by the requested Party.
ARTICLE 8
The requested authority may refuse to give effect to the request for assist-
ance or to supply the information obtained, if:
(a) the request is not in conformity with this Convention;
(b) the communication of the information obtained might constitute
an infringement of the sovereignty, security, essential interests
or public policy (ordre public) of the requested Party;
(c) the irregularities to which the requested information relates or
the sanctions provided for such irregularities are time-barred
under the law of the requesting or of the requested Party;
(d) the requested information relates to matters which arose before
the Convention entered into force for the requesting or the re-
quested Party;
(e) proceedings have already been commenced before the authori-
ties in the requested Party in respect of the same matters and
against the same persons, or if they have been finally adjudicated
upon in respect of the same matters by the competent authorities
of the requested Party;
(f) the authorities of the requested Party have decided not to com-
mence proceedings or to stop proceedings in respect of the same
matters.
ARTICLE 9
The requested authority shall, in so far as it is able to do so, supply the
information requested by the requesting authority in the form desired by
that authority or in the form currently in use between them.
ARTICLE 10
1. Any Party which has ascertained that there has been a substantial
breach by the requesting authority of the confidentiality of the informa-
tion provided may suspend the application of chapter II of this Conven-
tion with respect to the Party which has failed to discharge its obligation
and shall notify the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of its
decision. The Party may lift the suspension at any time and shall notify
the Secretary General accordingly.
2. Any Party which intends to make use of the procedure provided for
in paragraph 1 must first give an opportunity to the Party concerned to
make observations on the alleged breach of confidentiality.
3. The Secretary General of the Council of Europe shall inform the
member States and the Parties to this Convention of any use made of the




Parties may agree that, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 5.4, re-
quests for assistance and replies thereto may be drawn up in the language
of their choice and made according to simplified procedures or by em-
ploying means of communication other than the exchange of written
correspondence.
Chapter Ill-Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
ARTICLE 12
1. The Parties undertake to afford each other the widest measure of
mutual assistance in criminal matters relating to offenses involving in-
sider trading.
2. Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as restricting or preju-
dicing the application of the European Convention on Mutual Assistance
in Criminal Matters and the Additional Protocol thereto among states
party to these instruments or of specific agreements or arrangements on
mutual assistance in criminal matters in force between Parties.
Chapter IV-Final Provisions
ARTICLE 13
This Convention shall be open for signature by the member states of the
Council of Europe. It shall be subject to ratification, acceptance or ap-
proval. Instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval shall be de-
posited with the Secretary General of the Council of Europe.
ARTICLE 14
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the month
following the expiration of a period of three months after the date on
which three member states of the Council of Europe have expressed their
consent to be bound by the Convention in accordance with the provisions
of article 13.
2. In respect of any member state which subsequently expresses its con-
sent to be bound by it, the Convention shall enter into force on the first
day of the month following the expiration of a period of three months
after the date of the deposit of the instrument of ratification, acceptance
or approval.
ARTICLE 15
1. After the entry into force of this Convention, the Committee of Min-
isters of the Council of Europe may invite any state not a member of the
Council of Europe or any international intergovernmental organization
to accede to this Convention, by a decision taken by the majority pro-
vided for in article 20(d) of the Statute of the Council of Europe and by
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the unanimous vote of the representatives of the Contracting states enti-
tled to sit on the Committee.
2. In respect of any acceding state or international intergovernmental
organization, the Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the
month following the expiration of a period of three months after the date
of deposit of the instrument of accession with the Secretary General of
the Council of Europe.
ARTICLE 16
1. Any state may at the time of signature or when depositing its instru-
ment of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, specify the terri-
tory or territories to which this Convention shall apply.
2. Any contracting state may at any later date, by a declaration ad-
dressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, extend the
application of this Convention to any other territory specified in the dec-
laration. In respect of such territory the Convention shall enter into
force on the first day of the month following the expiration of a period of
three months after the date of receipt of such declaration by the Secre-
tary General.
3. Any declaration made under the two preceding paragraphs may, in
respect of any territory specified in such declaration, be withdrawn by a
notification addressed to the Secretary General. The withdrawal shall
become effective on the first day of the month following the expiration of
a period of three months after the date of receipt of such notification by
the Secretary General.
ARTICLE 17
Without prejudice to the application of article 6 no reservation may be
made to the Convention.
ARTICLE 18
1. After the entry into force of the present Convention, a group of ex-
perts representing the Parties to the Convention and the member states
of the Council of Europe not being Parties to the Convention shall be
convened at the request of at least two parties or on the initiative of the
Secretary General of the Council of Europe.
2. This group shall have the task of preparing an evaluation of the ap-
plication of the Convention and making appropriate suggestions.
ARTICLE 19
Difficulties with regard to the interpretation and application of this Con-
vention shall be settled by direct consultation between the competent ad-





1. Any Party may at any time denounce this Convention by means of a
notification addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe.
2. Such denunciation shall become effective on the first day of the
month following the expiration of a period of three months after the date
of receipt of the notification by the Secretary General; denunciation shall
not prejudice requests already in progress at the time of denunciation.
ARTICLE 21
The Secretary General of the Council of Europe shall notify the member
States of the Council and any Party to this Convention, of:
(a) any signature;
(b) the deposit of any instrument of ratification, acceptance, ap-
proval or accession;
(c) any date of entry into force of this Convention in accordance
with Articles 14, 15 and 16;
(d) any other Act, notification or communication relating to this
Convention.
In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto, have
signed this Convention.
Done at Strasbourg, the 20th April 1989, in English and French, both
texts being equally authentic, in a single copy which shall be deposited in
the archives of the Council of Europe. The Secretary General of the
Council of Europe shall transmit certified copies to each member state of
the Council of Europe and to any State and any international intergov-
ernmental organisation invited to accede to this Convention.
B. Protocol to the Convention on Insider Trading Opened for
Signature on 11 September 1989
The member states of the Council of Europe signatories to the Conven-
tion on insider trading (hereafter called the 'Convention') and to this
Protocol,
Having regard to the undertakings contained in chapters II and III of the
Convention relating to the exchange of information and the mutual
assistance in criminal matters respectively;
Considering that between states members of the European Economic
Community, the application of Community rules should be reserved;
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
ARTICLE I
The following provision shall be inserted in the Convention:
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"Article l6bis
In their mutual relations, Parties which are members of the European
Economic Community shall apply Community rules and shall therefore
not apply the rules arising from this Convention except in so far as there
is no Community rule governing the particular subject concerned."
ARTICLE 2
This Protocol shall be open for signature by the member states of the
Council of Europe signatories to the Convention. It shall be subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval. Instruments of ratification, accept-
ance or approval shall be deposited with the Secretary General of the
Council of Europe.
ARTICLE 3
This Protocol shall enter into force:
- either on the same date as the Convention, if on that date all con-
tracting states to the Convention have expressed their consent to be
bound by this Protocol, in accordance with the provisions of article 2,
- or subsequently, on the first day of the month after the date on which
all contracting states to the Convention have expressed their consent
to be bound by this Protocol in accordance with the provisions of
article 2.
ARTICLE 4
The Secretary General of the Council of Europe shall notify the member
states of the Council of Europe:
(a) any signature;
(b) the deposit of any instrument of ratification, acceptance or
approval;
(c) the date of entry into force of this Protocol in accordance with
the provisions of article 3;
(d) any other act, declaration, notification or communication relat-
ing to this Protocol.
In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto, have
signed this Protocol.
Done at Strasbourg, the 1 1th day of September 1989, in English and
French, both texts being equally authentic, in a single copy which shall
be deposited in the archives of the Council of Europe. The Secretary
General of the Council of Europe shall transmit certified copies to each
member state of the Council of Europe.
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I. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
A. Council Directive of 13 November 1989 Coordinating Regulations
on Insider Dealing (89/592/EEC) (OJEC 18.11.89 No L 334/30)
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Com-
munity, and in particular article 100a thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,'
In cooperation with the European Parliament,"
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, 2
Whereas, article 100a(l) of the Treaty states that the Council shall adopt
the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law,
regulation or administrative action in member states which have as their
object the establishment and functioning of the internal market;
Whereas, the secondary market in transferable securities plays an impor-
tant role in the financing of economic agents;
Whereas, for that market to be able to play its role effectively, every mea-
sure should be taken to ensure that market operates smoothly;
Whereas, the smooth operation of that market depends to a large extent
on the confidence it inspires in investors;
Whereas, the factors on which such confidence depends include the as-
surance afforded to investors that they are placed on an equal footing and
that they will be protected against the improper use of inside
information;
Whereas, by benefiting certain investors as compared with others, insider
dealing is likely to undermine that confidence and may therefore preju-
dice the smooth operation of the market;
Whereas, the necessary measures should therefore be taken to combat
insider dealing;
Whereas, in some member states there are no rules or regulations prohib-
iting insider dealing and whereas the rules or regulations that do exist
differ considerably from one member state to another;
Whereas, it is therefore advisable to adopt coordinated rules at a Com-
munity level in this field;
Whereas, such coordinated rules also have the advantage of making it
possible, through cooperation by the competent authorities, to combat
transfrontier insider dealing more effectively;
10. 1987 O.J. (C 153) 8; 1988 O.J. (C 277) 13.
11. 1987 O.J. (C 187) 93; and Decision of 1 October 1989 (not yet published in the
Official journal).
12. 1989 O.J. (C 35) 22.
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Whereas, since the acquisition or disposal of transferable securities neces-
sarily involves a prior decision to acquire or to dispose taken by the per-
son who undertakes one or other of these operations, the carrying out of
this acquisition or disposal does not constitute in itself the use of inside
information;
Whereas, insider dealing involves taking advantage of insider informa-
tion; whereas the mere fact that market-makers, bodies authorized to act
as contra-party, or stockbrokers with inside information confine them-
selves, in the first two cases, to pursuing their normal business of buying
or selling securities or, in the last, to carrying out an order should not in
itself be deemed to constitute use of such inside information; whereas
likewise the fact of carrying out transactions with the aim of stabilizing
the price of new issues or secondary offers of transferable securities
should not in itself be deemed to constitute use of inside information;
Whereas, estimates developed from publicly available data cannot be re-
garded as inside information and whereas, therefore, any transaction car-
ried out on the basis of such estimates does not constitute insider dealing
within the meaning of this Directive;
Whereas, communication of inside information to an authority, in order
to enable it to ensure that the provisions of this Directive or other provi-
sions in force are respected, obviously cannot be covered by the prohibi-
tions laid down by this Directive,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:
ARTICLE I
For the purposes of this Directive:
1. 'inside information' shall mean information which has not been
made public of a precise nature relating to one or several issuers of trans-
ferable securities or to one or several transferable securities, which, if it
were made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the price
of the transferable security or securities in question;
2. 'transferable securities' shall mean:
(a) shares and debt securities, as well as securities equivalent to
shares and debt securities;
(b) contracts or rights to subscribe for, acquire or dispose of securi-
ties, referred to in (a);
(c) futures contracts, options and financial futures in respect of se-
curities referred to in (a);
(d) index contracts in respect of securities referred to in (a),
when admitted to trading on a market which is regulated and supervised
by authorities recognized by public bodies, operates regularly and is ac-
cessible directly or indirectly to the public.
ARTICLE 2
1. Each member state shall prohibit any person who:
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- by virtue of his membership of the administrative, management or
supervisory bodies of the issuer,
- by virtue of his holding in the capital of the issuer, or
- because he has access to such information by virtue of the exercise of
his employment, profession or duties,
possesses inside information from taking advantage of that information
with full knowledge of the facts by acquiring or disposing of for his own
account or for the account of a third party, either directly or indirectly,
transferable securities of the issuer or issuers to which that information
relates.
2. Where the person referred to in paragraph 1 is a company or other
type of legal person, the prohibition laid down in that paragraph shall
apply to the natural persons who take part in the decision to carry out
the transaction for the account of the legal person concerned.
3. The prohibition laid down in paragraph 1 shall apply to any acquisi-
tion or disposal of transferable securities effected through a professional
intermediary.
Each member state may provide that this prohibition shall not apply to
acquisitions or disposals of transferable securities effected without the in-
volvement of a professional intermediary outside a market as defined in
Article 1(2) in fine.
4. This Directive shall not apply to transactions carried out in pursuit
of monetary, exchange rate or public debt management policies by a sov-
ereign state, by its central bank or any other body designated to that
effect by the state, or by any person acting on their behalf. Member
states may extend this exemption to their federated states or similar local
authorities in respect of the management of their public debt.
ARTICLE 3
Each member state shall prohibit any person subject to the prohibition
laid down in article 2 who possesses inside information from:
(a) disclosing that inside information to any third party unless such
disclosure is made in the normal course of the exercise of his
employment, profession or duties;
(b) recommending or procuring a third party, on the basis of that
inside information, to acquire or dispose of transferable securi-
ties admitted to trading on its securities markets as referred to in
article 1(2) in fine.
ARTICLE 4
Each member state shall also impose the prohibition provided for in arti-
cle 2 on any person other than those referred to in that article who with
full knowledge of the facts possesses inside information, the direct or in-
direct source of which could not be other than a person referred to in
article 2.
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ARTICLE 5
Each member state shall apply the prohibitions provided for in articles 2,
3, and 4, at least to actions undertaken within its territory to the extent
that the transferable securities concerned are admitted to trading on a
market of a member state. In any event, each member state shall regard
a transaction as carried out within its territory if it is carried out on a
market, as defined in article 1(2) in fine, situated or operating within that
territory.
ARTICLE 6
Each member state may adopt provisions more stringent than those laid
down by this Directive or additional provisions, provided that such pro-
visions are applied generally. In particular it may extend the scope of the
prohibition laid down in article 2 and impose on persons referred to in
article 4 the prohibitions laid down in article 3.
ARTICLE 7
The provisions of Schedule C.5(a) of the Annex to Directive 79/279/
EEC shall also apply to companies and undertakings the transferable se-
curities of which, whatever their nature, are admitted to trading on a
market as referred to in article 1(2) in fine of this Directive.
ARTICLE 8
1. Each member state shall designate the administrative authority or
authorities competent, if necessary in collaboration with other authorities
to ensure that the provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive are ap-
plied. It shall so inform the Commission which shall transmit that infor-
mation to all member states.
2. The competent authorities must be given all supervisory and investi-
gatory powers that are necessary for the exercise of their functions,
where appropriate in collaboration with other authorities.
ARTICLE 9
Each member state shall provide that all persons employed or formerly
employed by the competent authorities referred to in article 8 shall be
bound by professional secrecy. Information covered by professional se-
crecy may not be divulged to any person or authority except by virtue of
provisions laid down by law.
ARTICLE 10
1. The competent authorities in the member states shall cooperate with
each other whenever necessary for the purpose of carrying out their du-
ties, making use of the powers mentioned in article 8(2). To this end, and
notwithstanding article 9, they shall exchange any information required
for that purpose, including information relating to actions published,
under the options given to member states by article 5 and by the second
sentence of article 6, only by the member state requesting cooperation.
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Information thus exchanged shall be covered by the obligation of profes-
sional secrecy to which the persons employed or formerly employed by
the competent authorities receiving the information are subject.
2. The competent authorities may refuse to act on a request for
information:
(a) where communication of the information might adversely affect
the sovereignty, security or public policy of the state addressed;
(b) where judicial proceedings have already been initiated in respect
of the same actions and against the same persons before the au-
thorities of the state addressed or where final judgment has al-
ready been passed on such persons for the same actions by the
competent authorities of the state addressed.
3. Without prejudice to the obligations to which they are subject in ju-
dicial proceedings under criminal law, the authorities which receive in-
formation pursuant to paragraph 1 may use it only for the exercise of
their functions within the meaning of article 8(1) and in the context of
administrative or judicial proceedings specifically relating to the exercise
of those functions. However, where the competent authority communi-
cating information consents thereto, the authority receiving the informa-
tion may use it for other purposes or forward it to other states'
competent authorities.
ARTICLE 11
The Community may, in conformity with the Treaty, conclude agree-
ments with non-member countries on the matters governed by this
Directive.
ARTICLE 12
The Contact Committee set up by article 20 of Directive 79/279/EEC
shall also have as its function:
(a) to permit regular consultation on any practical problems, which
arise from the application of this Directive and on which ex-
changes of view are deemed useful;
(b) to advise the Commission, if necessary, on any additions or
amendments to be made to this Directive.
ARTICLE 13
Each member state shall determine the penalties to be applied for in-
fringement of the measures taken pursuant to this Directive. The penal-
ties shall be sufficient to promote compliance with those measures.
ARTICLE 14
1. Member states shall take the measures necessary to comply with this
Directive before 1 June 1992. They shall forwith inform the Commission
thereof.
2. Member states shall communicate to the Commission the provisions
of national law which they adopt in this field governed by this Directive.
[Vol. 61
1993] GERMAN ANTIFRA UD REGULATIONS S99
ARTICLE 15
This Directive is addressed to the member states.

